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MARK McELMAN 
During the early morning hours of October 15th, 1982, John Henry 
Sansregret broke into the home of his fonner girlfriend. He threatened 
her with a butcher's knife and struck her in the face, drawing blood. He 
forced her to undress in order to prevent her from leaving the house. 
During this ten-i:fying situation his ex-girlfriend, in an attempt to prevent 
the hostilities from escalating, pretended she was interested in 
reconciling with Sansregret. She told him that they could be lovers again 
and initiated sexual intercourse. Later that morning, after Sansregret was 
safely out of the house, the girlfriend called the police and filed a 
complaint. Soon after, Sansregret was arrested and charged with sexual 
assault, among other offences. 1 
At trial, the only significant issue with respect to the sexual assault 
charge was whether the Crown could prove that Sansregret had known 
that the complainant's consent had been ext01ted by threat or fear of 
bodily harm.2 Sansregret asserted the defence of honest mistaken belief 
in consent. In a strange twist, this assertion was given credence by the 
evidence of the complainant. She testified that she knew the accused 
very well and that she was quite certain he had believed, at the time of 
the incident, that her consent was been genuine. 
The trial judge found that there had been no real consent to the 
sexual activity, and that "no one in their right mind" would have 
believed consent existed. Despite this, and relying almost exclusively on 
the testimony of the complainant, the judge found that Sansregret had 
been under an honest mistaken belief in consent. Given this finding of 
fact, the judge directed herself to follow the rule set out in R. v. 
Pappajohn;3 that an honest mistaken belief in consent negates proof of 
mens rea. She acquitted on the charge of sexual assault. 
1 The facts here are taken from!?. JJ. Sansregre!, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570, 45 C.R. (3'd) 193 
(S.C.c.). 
2 (1983) 34 C.R. (3d) 162 (Man. Co. Ct.). 
3 [ 1980] 2 S.C.R. 120. 
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The Crown appealed the decision to the Manitoba Court of Appeal, 
where the acquittal was overturned and a conviction entered. 4 This result 
produced tension in the Court, with each judge writing a separate 
decision. Matas J.A. held that the accused was barred from raising the 
defence of mistake by the evidentiary ruling in Pappajohn, which 
requires the assertion of mistaken belief in consent to have an "air of 
reality". He stated: 
.. .it is not open to Mr. Sansregret to terrorize his victim, to follow up 
the terror with sexual intercourse, and to end up by innocently 
claiming he had an honest belief in his victim's consent. I have 
concluded that the defence of mistake of fact does not arise in this 
case. 5 
This finding may seem strange given that the complainant's testimony 
had established the factual finding which led to the success of the 
defence at trial. Her credibility in asserting his mistaken belief in 
consent can hardly be doubted. This was essentially the position taken 
by Philp J.A. in his dissenting opinion. He accepted the findings of fact 
at trial and concluded that the defence of mistaken belief in consent had 
been successfully established. Like the trial judge, he based his 
judgement on the testimony of the complainant and would have upheld 
the acquittal and dismissed the Crown's appeal. 
Sansregret appealed his conviction, as of right, to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. The Court, in a unanimous decision, upheld his 
conviction. Writing for the Court, Mcintyre J. chose not to disturb the 
finding at trial that Sansregret had acted under an honest mistaken belief 
in consent. However, he held that the trial judge had erred in allowing 
the defence of mistake of fact given her finding that Sansregret had been 
willfully blind to the complainant's lack of consent: 
In my view, it was error on the part of the trial judge to give effect to 
the "mistake of fact" defence in these circumstances where she had 
found that the complainant consented out of fear and the appellant was 
willfully blind to the existing circumstances, seeing only what he 
wished to see. Where the accused is deliberately ignorant as a result of 
blinding himself to reality the law presumes knowledge, in this case 
knowledge of the nature of the consent. There was therefore no room 
for the operation of this defence. 
4 (1984) 10 C.C.C (3d) 164, 37 C.R. (3d) 45 (Man. C.A.). 
5 IO C.C.C (3d) 164 at 171-2. 
326-DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
This is not to be taken as a retreat from the position taken in Pappa.John 
that the honest belief in consent need not be reasonable. It is not to be 
thought that any time an accused fonns an honest though unreasonable 
belief he will be deprived of the defence of mistake of fact. This case 
rests on a different proposition. Having willfully blinded himself to the 
facts before him, the fact that an accused may be able to preserve what 
could be called an honest belief, in the sense that he has no specific 
knowledge to the contrary, will not afford a defence because, where 
the accused becomes deliberately blind to the existing facts, he is fixed 
by law with actual knowledge and his belief in another state of facts is 
ine levan t. 6 
This decision has stirred much controversy, due in large part to the 
intricacy of the conceptual analysis. 7 The concept of "mistake of fact" is 
forced into competition with the rival concept of "willful blindness" 
such that the Court is forced to define the boundaries between the two. 
The Court's final conceptualization is clear: willful blindness negates 
mistaken belief as a defence in sexual assault. Less explicit is exactly 
how and why this is so. 
Much of the confusion and controversy in this area of the law can 
be rectified by employing an explicit analysis of the objects of the 
debate: the competing mental states of mistaken belief and willful 
blindness. The Supreme Court made it clear in Sansregret that any 
overlap between the categories will be subsumed into the latter. 
However, the fundamental question regarding the conditions under 
which mistaken belief amounts to willful blindness remains 
unanswered. The analysis which will be applied to this problem is 
epistemological. Epistemology (the theory of knowledge) is a central 
discipline in philosophy that is concerned with the interaction between 
belief, truth, justification, and knowledge. Central questions in this field 
concern how individuals respond to their environment though the 
formation of belief, and the conditions under which those beliefs can be 
said to constitute knowledge. The approach to be applied to the problem 
is intuitive, using hypothetical examples to generate basic instincts 
about culpability. Intuitions regarding culpability are then subjected to 
epistemological analysis in the hope of generating a new doctrinal 
model of criminal fault. 
6 Supra note I at 587-8. 
7 D. Stuart, Canadian Cni11i11al Law: A Treatise, 3'<l ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) at 212. 
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An epistemological ana.lysis is warranted on three grounds. First, 
whenever the law sees fit to make "knowledge of a circumstance" an 
element of a criminal offense, it has inherently embarked on an 
epistemological inquiry. This is similar to the way in which courts are 
forced to consider empirical science when causation is incorporated as 
an element of an offence. The question "Did the stab wound kill the 
victim?" is a matter of medical science. Similarly, the question "Did the 
accused hzow that the goods in his possession were stolen?" is a matter 
of epistemology. Being explicit about epistemology and its place in the 
criminal law may allow for a more productive conceptual analysis. 
Second, epistemology concerns itself with questions of objectivity 
(trnth) and subjectivity (belief). In this sense, epistemology is a blended 
inquiry, partly concerned with beliefs actually held by a subject, and 
partly concerned with the objective truth of that which is believed. This 
blending of objective and subjective considerations may allow for the 
development of a principled compromise between the current 
polarization of subjectivist and objectivist orthodoxies. Each orthodoxy 
is based on rival intuitions regarding the conditions under which 
criminal punishment may be imposed. Given the theoretical standstill 
between the positions, perhaps it is time to generate new intuitions. 
Lastly, this analysis is justified on the basis that individuals are, by 
nature, epistemological agents. They are accustomed to succeeding or 
failing on the basis of their ability to form accurate beliefs about their 
environments. Holdings of legal accountability on the basis of 
epistemological ideals are, therefore, well fitted into a pre-existing 
scheme. This has the advantage of not forcing upon people a normative 
regime with which they are unfamiliar, as is often the case in the 
imposition of the brute force of law. 8 
This paper will proceed in four parts. Part I will consist of a brief 
summary of current jurisprudence surrounding the doctrine of me11s rea, 
focussing on the debate concerning whether the imposition of criminal 
liability requires a subjective or objective model of fault. Part II will 
present the basic epistemological ideals that will form the basis of 
subsequent analysis. Part III will bring into focus the epistemological 
8 For instance, the criminal justice system could assume that individuals are informed of the 
necessity of careful belief formation and would not have to exercise a Section 19 proJJ1so 
deeming them to be so informed. 
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elements of the offence of sexual assault. Part IV will demonstrate how 
a new doctrine of willful blindness might be employed by the comts, in 
cases of sexual assault. 
PARTI 
The doctrine of mens rea has spawned more jurisprudencial 
commentary than any other substantive subject in the criminal law.9 Its 
basic feature is the notion that no act is guilty unless it is accompanied 
by a guilty mind. The constitutional dimensions of the doctrine are 
developed in R. v. Creighton10 and R. v. Hzmda/, 11 which serve to 
highlight and distinguish subjective and objective models of criminal 
fault. In Hzmdal, Cory J. stated: 
Depending on the provisions of the pa1ticular section and the context 
in which it appears, the constitutional requirement of mens rea may be 
satisfied in different ways. The offense can require proof of a positive 
state of mind such as intent, recklessness or willful blindness. 
Alternatively, the mens rea or element of fault can be satisfied by 
proof of negligence whereby the conduct of the accused is measured 
on the basis of an objective standard without establishing the 
subjective mental state of the particular accused. 12 
Justice Cory went on to distinguish the tests proposed by each model: 
A truly subjective test seeks to determine what was actually in the 
mind of the pmticular accused at the moment the offence is alleged to 
have been committed. 
In his very useful text, Professor Stuart puts it this way in Canadian 
Criminal Law, supra, at pp. 123-124 and 125: 
What is vital is that this accused given his personality, situation and 
circumstances, actually intended, knew or foresaw the consequence 
and/or circumstance as the case may be, whether he "could'', "ought" 
or "should" have foreseen or whether a reasonable person would have 
foreseen is not the relevant criterion of liability. 
9 SlijJranote 7 at 139. 
10 (1993) 23 C.R. (4'11) 189 (S.C.C.). 
11 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 867, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 97, 19 C.R. (4'11) 169. 
12 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 867 at 882. 
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In trying to ascertain what was going on in the accused's mind, as the 
subjective approach demands, the trier of fact may draw reasonable 
inferences from the accused's actions or words at the time of his act or 
in the witness box. The accused may or may not be believed. To 
conclude that, considering all the evidence, the Crown has proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused "must" have thought in the 
penalized way is no depaiiure from the subjective standard. Resort to 
an objective would only occur if the reasoning became that the 
accused "must have realized it if he had thought about it". [Emphasis 
in original.] 
On the other hand, the test for negligence is an objective one requiring 
a marked depaiiure from the standard of care of a reasonable person. 
There is no need to establish the intention of the particular accused. 
The question to be answered under the objective test concerns what the 
accused "should" have known .... [T]here should be a clear distinction 
in the law between one who was aware (pure subjective intent) and one 
who should have taken care in-espective of awareness (pure objective 
intent). 13 
The implications of the subjective model of liability are most 
striking when viewed from the perspective afforded by the defence of 
mistake of fact. This defence was established in Canada through the 
cases of R. v. Rees14 and R. v. Beaver. 15 These cases developed the legal 
rule that, where subjective knowledge of a circumstance forms the mens 
rea of an offence, an honest mistaken belief regarding the circumstance 
negates proof of the required fault element. Thus, in Beaver the accused 
was acquitted on a charge of possession of a narcotic because he 
honestly believed the white powder found in his possession was sugar-
of-milk. His honest belief to that effect prevented the Crown from 
discharging its burden of proving that he had known that the powder was 
a narcotic. 
The defence of honest mistake of fact was explicitly held to apply 
to the offence of sexual assault in R. v. Pappajohn. 16 This case followed 
the reasoning in the controversial British case Director of Public 
13 /bid at 882-3. 
14 [1956] S.C.R. 640, 24 C.R. 1, 115 C.C.C. 1, 4 D.L.R. (2d) 406. 
15 [1957] S.C.R. 531, 26 C.R. 193, 118 C.C.C. 129. 
16 Supra note 3. 
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Prosecutions v. Morgan. 17 In each case it was held that an honest though 
mistaken belief in consent exculpates the accused on a charge of sexual 
assault, irrespective of whether the mistake was unreasonable. In 
Pappajohn, Dickson J. laid out the defence as it pertains to sexual 
assault: 
It is not clear how one can properly relate reasonableness (an element 
in offences of negligence) to rape (a "true crime" and not an offence of 
negligence). To do so, one must, I think take the view that the mens rea 
goes only to the physical act of intercourse and not to non-consent, and 
acquittal comes only if the mistake is reasonable. This, upon the 
authorities, is not a correct view, the intent in rape being not merely to 
have intercourse, but to have it with a non-consenting woman. If the 
jury finds that mistake, whether reasonable or unreasonable, there 
should be no conviction. If, upon the entire record, there is evidence of 
mistake to cast a reasonable doubt upon the existence of a criminal 
mind, then the prosecution has failed to make its case. 18 
The idea that an unreasonable mistake as to consent is exculpatory is 
surprising, but the doctrine is simply a logical consequence of the 
subjectivist model. 
The doctrine of willful blindness fits into the subjectivist scheme in 
a rather tenuous way. The uneasy fit is particularly surprising given that 
a single theorist, Glanville Williams, has played a significant role in the 
entrenchment of both doctrines. Of willful blindness, Williams states: 
A court can properly find willful blindness only where it can almost be 
said that the defendant actually knew. He suspected the fact; he 
realised its probability; but he refrained from obtaining the final 
confirmation because he wanted in the event to be able to deny 
knowledge. This, and this alone, is willful blindness. It requires in 
effect a finding that the defendant intended to cheat the administration 
of justice. Any wider definition would make the doctrine of willful 
blindness indistinguishable from the civil doctrine of negligence in not 
obtaining knowledge. 19 
Thus, willful blindness seems to be a type of virtual knowledge the 
courts will find when they feel an accused became aware of the need for 
further inquiry but declined to make that inquiry because he did not wish 
to know the tmth. In a sense, the accused has constmcted a situation in 
17 [1976] A.C.182, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347 (H.L.). 
18 Supra note 3 at 152. 
19 G.L. Williams, Cni11i!la! Law; The Ge!leral Fart, 2d ed. (London: Stevens, 1961) at 159. 
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which knowledge can technically be denied because he chose to remain 
ignorant. This doctrine has an uneasy feel: the only motive to engage in 
this type of cognitive risk management resides in an implicit 
acknowledgement that a risk is present. An acknowledgement to this 
effect already satisfies the requirements for a finding of recklessness, 
which is also a guilty mental state under the subjectivist model of 
culpability. On this account, it seems that wilful blindness may simply 
be a convoluted form of recklessness. If wilful blindness is to stand 
alone as a distinct form of mens rea, then it should be differentiated, 
conceptually, from recklessness. A more productive conception of 
wilful blindness is one that focuses, not on a deliberate suppression of 
risk awareness, but rather on an active suppression. 
The subjectivist/objectivist doctrinal debate has taken on political 
dimensions in recent years. The political debate over the doctrines is 
especially acute in respect of their application to the offence of sexual 
assault. As evidenced by Pappajohn, the courts have elected to employ 
the subjective model to this offence. Liberals defend this on the grounds 
that the imposition of criminal punishment requires justification. Liberal 
theorists maintain that punishment for sexual assault can only be 
justified when there exists an element of subjective fault on the part of 
the accused. It is the guilty activity of the accused, both mental and 
physical, which justifies punishment. It is not the hypothetical activities 
of the "reasonable person" which should be the criterion for fault. 
Feminist theorists have taken exception to this structuring of fault in 
sexual assault.20 Placing the crucial factor for the determination of guilt 
in the minds of accused (typically men) sacrifices women's interest in 
the security of their bodies to the liberty interests of male accused. Many 
feminists believe the appropriate balance here is to be reached through 
the careful employment of the objective model of fault. 21 It is only 
through the imposition of a legal duty to act reasonably that women can 
be satisfactorily protected from sexual interference. This, however, 
raises the liberal critique that individuals should not be punished as an 
20 See T. Pickard, "Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Relating ;Wells Rea to the Crime" ( 1980), 
30 U.T.L.J. 75; and T. Pickard, "Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Harsh Words on Pappajohn" 
(1980), 30 U.T.L.J. 415. 
21 lbtd. 
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instrument of public policy. To do so denies the Kantian ethic that 
individuals are never to be treated as the means to an end.22 
Thus we have a true dilemma: the premise of the liberal argument 
for subjective fault denies the premise of the feminist argument for 
objective fault. This amounts to an incommensurability between the two 
doctrinal orthodoxies. This incommensurability rests on the liberal/ 
subjectivist's insistence that the individual must play an active part in 
his mental guilt. Liberals have insisted that the required activity is only 
found in the subjective awareness of a risk, or the deliberate suppression 
thereof, and a decision to proceed despite that risk. There is, however, an 
alternate form of cognitive activity which justifies the imposition of 
punishment. This activity can be demonstrated via the conception of 
willful blindness which is already being employed by Canadian courts, 
such as in Sansregret. 
This alternative analysis of willful blindness attempts to establish a 
middle ground between the subjectivist's assertion that an honest 
mistake as to consent is exculpatory and the objectivist's assertion that 
only reasonable mistakes are exculpatory. The analysis employs an 
intuitive approach to hypothetical examples, drawing explicit attention 
to the manner in which beliefs are formed and held. The use of "active 
suppression" of risk awareness may generate a new conception of 
willful blindness, and it is hoped that the subjective activity of this new 
conception will be sufficient to meet liberal concerns regarding the 
justification of punishment while, at the same time, satisfying feminist 
demands for greater protection of women from sexual assault. 
PART II 
The basic aim of epistemology is to determine the conditions under 
which an individual can be said to have knowledge in respect of some 
fact. Traditionally, this has been determined using a tripartite analysis; 
knowledge is obtained when one has a justified, true belief. Thus, one 
has knowledge in respect of some fact if, and only if one believes the fact 
to be true, one is justified in believing it to be true, and the fact is, indeed, 
22 B. Rolfes, "The Golden Thread of the Criminal Law Moral Culpability and Sexual 
Assault" (1998), 61 Sask. L. Rev. 87. 
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uue. 23 This analysis employs both objective and subjective elements. 
The subjective element is the belief actually held by the individual. The 
objective element is the truth of that which is believed. The subjective 
fact of the belief is linked to the objective fact of truth via the hybrid 
condition of justification. The justification condition is hybrid to the 
extent that it must be actually held in the mind of the believer 
(subjective) and it must also be objectively capable of supporting the 
inference that the fact believed is probable.24 
This tripartite analysis of knowledge (justified true belief) is not 
employed in the legal analysis of subjective guilt. This is likely due to 
the fact that talk of "justification" sounds like a resort to the objective 
model. When subjective knowledge of circumstance forms an element 
of an offence, the law employs what might be called a bipartite analysis: 
a purely objective inquiry (a determination as to the presence of the 
actus reus) and a purely subjective inquiry (determination as to the 
presence of mens rea). The trier of fact is to determine whether the 
prescribed condition actually existed at the time of the alleged offence, 
and whether the particular accused believed the condition to exist. On an 
epistemological account this arrangement is too simplistic and is bound 
to result in error. 
For instance, consider the following hypothetical example. 
Imagine that Mark lives next to a pawnshop. Mark believes the owner of 
23 For instance, I know that the computer I am currently working on is a Macintosh if, and 
only if; I believe it is a Mac, I am justified in holding this belief, and it is in fact true that the 
computer is a Mac. 
24 Thus, I know that the computer I am currently using is a Macintosh if, and only if: I 
believe it is a Mac, it is in fact a Mac, and I believe in some condition which makes it 
objectively probable that it is a Mac. For instance, this justification could follow from the fact 
that I have observed a small apple-like logo on the computer's exterior. In this case the 
justification would be founded on a perception combined with a belief that Macintosh 
computers cany such a logo. Alternatively, my justification could reside in a belief that the 
computer's owner is a die-hard Macintosh enthusiast who would not likely consider 
purchasing anything but that particular brand of computer. In this case, my belief is justified 
on the basis of other beliefs. In the first instance, where my belief is generated though 
observation, an epistemologist would say that my belief is founded on perception. It is a 
perceived condition of the computer that makes it likely to be a Mac. In the second instance, it 
is not a condition about the computer itself that makes it likely to be a Mac, but rather a belief 
about its owner, specifically that she bought it and that she would likely only buy a Mac. An 
epistemologist would label this belief as justified by coherence with other beliefs. The only 
infonnation I have about the computer is its owner, yet my beliefs about the owner can justify 
beliefs about the computer itself. 
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the pawnshop is a crook and that his entire inventory consists of stolen 
goods. Mark therefore avoids dealings with the shop owner, despite the 
availability of some good deals. One day Mark walks by the shop and 
notices a saxophone for sale in the window. Mark has always wanted to 
play the saxophone, but has never been able to afford one at retail prices. 
Despite the fact that he believes the saxophone to be stolen, Mark 
can not pass up the opportunity to realize his dream. He buys the 
instrument, takes it home, and begins to learn how to play. After a while, 
however, Mark becomes consumed by guilt over his actions and every 
note reminds him of his misdeed. He decides to tum himself in to the 
police and take responsibility. 
The police are baffled by all of this as they know the pawnshop 
owner and hold him in the highest regard. The owner routinely calls 
police regarding suspicious goods and his reputation in the community 
is beyond reproach. Despite this, the police check the serial number on 
the sax and discover that it was in fact stolen in a break-and-enter some 
years ago. 
This raises the question of Mark's guilt or innocence. He believed 
the saxophone to be stolen at the time he purchased it, and it was in fact 
stolen. Thus, it seems that both the actus reus and mens rea of the 
offence of possession of stolen goods are present and readily provable. 
On the bipartite analysis this would indicate Mark's guilt. However, if 
Mark's belief that the shop owner is a crook is not justified, then the co-
incidence of actus reus and mens rea is merely that, coincidence. In the 
absence of any justification for believing the shop owner to be a crook, 
Mark's belief is mere folly. It would be equally capricious for the 
criminal justice system to compound the folly of Mark's belief by 
attaching criminal liability to it. One might choose to exculpate Mark on 
the basis that he did not know the sax was stolen; he merely believed it to 
be stolen and his belief happened to be true. Mark made a mistake in 
believing the sax to be stolen, not because it was untrue, but because he 
had no justification for his belief. 
Thus, the bipartite analysis of fault must be complimented by a 
doctrine of mistake if it is to avoid, on principled grounds, the 
imposition of punishment in absurd ways. This raises a question as to 
the conditions under which mistaken belief should exculpate an 
accused. Current doctrine places only one condition on mistaken belief: 
honesty. Honesty, in this doctrinal account, is synonymous with 
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"actually held". Thus, under the doctrine, a mistaken belief actually held 
is exculpatory. However, this can also lead to absurdities. Consider the 
following hypothetical examples of two individuals who come into 
possession of cocaine. 
Mr. Jones has a rather strange hobby: he collects small items he 
finds on the streets of Halifax. He believes his collection will serve as a 
valuable historic account of ordinary life in the late 20th century. One 
day Jones is walking down the sidewalk when he sees a small glass vial, 
apparently discarded, on the side of the street. He picks up the vial and 
notices it has a label on which is written the word "cocaine". This alaims 
Jones as he would really like to add the item to his collection, but he does 
not wish to run afoul of the law. His anxiety is put to rest, however, when 
he notices the vial contains a pure white powder. Believing that cocaine 
is deep blue in colour, Jones reasons that even heavily diluted cocaine 
could never be so white. Having settled his mind that the powder is not 
cocaine (or any other narcotic) he places the vial in his pocket and 
continues down the street. 
Prof. Smith is a prominent biochemist and ecologist. He is 
notorious for asserting a rather strange theory that cocaine does not 
exist. Smith has written extensively on the non-existence of cocaine, his 
theory being that the coca plant is long extinct and that drug dealers are 
exploiting a psychosomatic effect by passing off benign white powder 
as a drug. On this basis he has advocated that the narcotic control law be 
amended, removing "cocaine" as a prohibited substance. Smith's theory 
has met with much resistance in the scientific field. This has only 
strengthened his resolve to prove his theory. 
Smith decides to prove his theory by running an experiment. He 
has found twenty graduate students in the biology department who have 
agreed to volunteer as subjects, but they have not been told the exact 
nature of the experiment which is to take place. Smith has purchased a 
quantity of white powder from a local drug dealer. He has tested the 
chemical composition of the powder and has found it to match the 
composition of so-called "cocaine". He mixes the powder into ten 
glasses of orange juice and pours another ten glasses of unadulterated 
juice. The glasses of juice are then distributed to the volunteers and their 
behaviour is observed and recorded. 
Is either Jones or Smith guilty of any crime? One may intuit that 
Mr. Jones is not guilty of possession of a narcotic and that Prof. Smith is 
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guilty of both possession and trafficking. This intuition is difficult to 
explain given conventional legal doctrine. It seems that both men were 
under an honest mistaken belief that the powder in their possession was 
not cocaine. Mr. Jones honestly believed that it was not cocaine because 
it was not blue. Prof. Smith believed that the powder was not cocaine 
because he believes that nothing is "cocaine". As well, each man's belief 
in respect of the powder was unreasonable. Reasonable people know 
that when they find a strange vial of white powder labeled "cocaine", 
there is a very real risk that the contents are actually cocaine. Reasonable 
people also know that when one approaches a drug dealer, asks for 
cocaine, and is given a quantity of white powder, the powder is probably 
cocaine. Furthermore, it seems that Jones (the innocent party) will have 
a difficult time establishing the defence of mistake. His subjective belief 
that cocaine is blue is so objectively unreasonable that it is unlikely that 
any trier of fact would view it as credible. Smith, on the other hand, will 
be able to advance a great deal of evidence tending to establish his 
honest belief that the powder was not cocaine (i.e. his previous writings 
describing his theory, conversations with colleagues, etc.). 
If one is correct in the intuition that Jones has acted innocently and 
that Smith has not, then the difference cannot be accounted for on any of 
the following bases: honesty qf be/if!/( each man, by hypothesis, actually 
held a belief that the powder was not cocaine); reasonableness ef belt([/ 
(each belief was unreasonable); or evtdentiaryconstderations(the guilty 
man will have no trouble forwarding credible evidence while the 
innocent man will only have his word). This leaves one with the task of 
explaining intuitions about the innocence of Mr. Jones and the guilt of 
Prof. Smith on grounds not mentioned above.25 
The difference might be explained by considering three separate 
factors. First, Smith's belief about the non-existence of cocaine is what 
epistemologists would call recalcitrant. This means that the structure of 
his belief system is unresponsive to change, due to a high degree of 
internal coherence. Smith's beliefs about cocaine have formed an 
interconnected web such that perceptual indications inconsistent with 
the cohered system are discarded as unworthy of consideration or belief. 
25 Perhaps the best explanation is that my intuitions are simply incorrect. I think they are 
con-ect, but there is room for reasonable disagreement on the matter. 
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There is an active suppression of true belief inherent in the way Smith 
interacts with his environment. 26 
Compare this to Jones. The belief that led him aw1y was not 
recalcitrant; it was an isolated mistake regarding a feature indicative of 
cocaine, namely its colour. This single belief does not cohere into a 
system. Jones continued to inspect objects in his possession and 
attempted to determine the presence of cocaine. To this extent he is still 
responsive to his environment. He failed in his attempt to determine 
whether the powder was cocaine, but only because of a simple mistake. 
Moreover, Smith's recalcitrant web of belief regarding the non-
existence of cocaine is inconsistent with the criminal law. The law 
asserts, as one of its premises, that cocaine exists. Smith's belief 
structure denies this assumption. In respect of cocaine, Smith's belief 
structure has become a law unto itself. Jones' beliefs, on the other hand, 
do not deny any fundamental assumptions of the criminal law. His 
mistake is consistent with the law, but has led him astray in his attempt 
to obey it. 
The last salient feature of the difference between the two men is 
that Smith's beliefs cause him to act in a way that puts others at a risk of 
hann. Smith does not realize this, but it is true nonetheless. Jones' 
beliefs, and the actions motivated by them, do not place others at a direct 
risk of harm. 
Smith might, therefore, be justifiably punished on the grounds that 
he unreasonably believed what might be called a "myth" about cocaine. 
He believed in this myth so strongly that it led him to reject any 
perceptions inconsistent with it. The myth, in a sense, distorted his 
perception of reality and actively suppressed the fonnation of true 
belief. While the reasonable person's beliefs reflect reality, Smith's 
reality became a reflection of his beliefs. What's more, the myth itself is 
both inconsistent with the law and likely to subject people to the type of 
harm contemplated by the law. 
Given this, a case can be made that Smith's beliefs about cocaine 
come extremely close to the current legal doctrine of willful blindness. 
While there is no deliberate suppression of knowledge, there is an active 
26 This is comparable to a situation where someone believes so strongly that a computer is 
a Macintosh (because of the fidelity of its Mac-loyal owner) that he begins to reject 
observations to the contrary (the IBM logo was painted on as a joke, the IBM warranty card 
attached to the back belongs to another computer, etc.). 
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suppression of knowledge by the workings of the mind. Furthermore, 
the current insistence on deliberate suppression is problematic in two 
ways. First, in so far as the process of suppression is supposed to be 
deliberate, it is indistinguishable from recklessness. One would only be 
motivated to act deliberately if one were aware of the potential presence 
of risk. Once the mind has averted to a risk, recklessness attaches to any 
actions until concerns about the risk have passed. This can only happen 
by giving the risk further consideration and not by deliberately ignoring 
it. Second, the process of belief formation is automatic and not subject to 
influences of the will. Individuals acquire beliefs regarding risks as soon 
as they evaluate some justification for believing risk is present. Once 
this happens, the belief in the risk remains until such time as it ceases to 
be justified. For instance, one might notice that one is showing the 
symptoms of a disease. As soon as this happens, one will automatically 
form a belief regarding the risk of actually having the disease. As long as 
the symptoms remain and are not explained as being caused by some 
other factor, belief in the risk will remain. The belief in the risk will not 
always be at the fore of the mind and the individual may even attempt to 
ignore it by thinking about other things, but the belief in the risk will 
continue so long as its justification continues. 
Given these two considerations, it seems that a doctrine of willful 
blindness which focuses on an active suppression of true belief is a 
better epistemological model than one based on deliberate suppression 
of true belief. A new concept of willful blindness based on active 
suppression seems to capture the intent of the old doctrine while 
avoiding two of its problematic features. An "active suppression" model 
of willful blindness is distinct from recklessness and not founded on 
shaky epistemological grounds. 
PART ill 
In order to examine how a new conception of willful blindness may 
relate to sexual assault offences, it is necessary to begin by looking at the 
structure of the offence and examining the elements the Crown is 
required to prove. Section 265 of the Criminal Code defines sexual 
assault: 
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265. (1) Assault-A person commits an "assault" when 
(a) without the consent of another person, he applies force 
intentionally to that other person, directly or indirectly. 27 
The recent case of .R. v. Ewanchuli28 provides a comprehensive 
judicial interpretation of sexual assault. In Ewanchukthe Supreme Comi 
held that the actus reus of "without consent" is determined through a 
subjective inquiry into the attitude of the complainant. To establish the 
actus reus, the Crown must prove that the complainant did not want to 
engage in the sexual activity. The mens rea of this element is established 
upon proof that the accused had subjective knowledge that the 
complainant did not communicate consent. If the defence can raise a 
reasonable doubt as to either of these issues, an acquittal should follow. 
However, if the prosecution has a strong case with respect to these 
issues, a tactical shift occurs. In this event, the defence will likely want 
to raise a reasonable doubt as to the fact that the accused believed 
consent was communicated. If the trier of fact is satisfied, on the 
criminal standard, that consent was not communicated, then defence 
arguments about the accused's subjective belief that consent was 
communicated will amount to the defence of honest mistaken belief in 
consent. This "failure of proof' defence is the topic with which the rest 
of the paper will be concerned. 
The first feature to note is the explicit holding in Ewanchukthat the 
defence of mistaken belief in consent relates only to the accused's 
beliefs regarding communication of consent. A mistake to the effect that 
the accused believed the complainant desired the sexual activity is 
irrelevant. The desires of the complainant are only relevant to the 
establishment of the actus rezts. The defence of mistake pertains only to 
the mens rea element, and the only material issue here is the accused's 
beliefs regarding any communication which occurred prior to the sexual 
touching. 
This legal distinction between actus reus "consent" (the subjective 
attitude of the complainant) and mens rea "consent" (the beliefs of the 
accused regarding communication of permission to touch) is 
27 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
28 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330. 
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problematic both conceptually and pragmatically.29 The first problem is 
that the trier of fact may confuse the two types of "consent". This has 
been ameliorated to a large extent by the explicit instructions in 
Ewanchulc. The second problem is not quite so easily dealt with. It 
involves the way in which an accused's beliefs about the desires 
(attitude) of the complainant are likely to influence his interpretation of 
any communication arising between himself and the complainant. 
A belief on the part of an accused that the complainant wanted to 
engage in sexual touching is not relevant to any formal element of the 
offense of sexual assault. However, this belief will likely have a great 
influence on the accused's interpretation of communication, which is a 
material element. If an accused's belief that the complainant desired the 
sexual touching causes him to interpret communication in such a way 
that he believed consent was granted, then an irrelevant belief forms the 
basis for his holding a relevant belief (i.e. a belief which establishes the 
defence of mistake of fact). This, in effect, would allow an accused to 
take indirect advantage of a belief which is not directly relevant. 
For this reason, it is submitted that a novel doctrine of willful 
blindness is necessary in order to determine guilt in sexual assault cases 
where mistaken belief in consent is raised. The doctrine will closely 
resemble that described in Pati II of this paper. If the accused's beliefs 
about the attitude of the complainant actively suppressed a correct 
interpretation of her communications, then the accused should be barred 
from asserting his mistaken belief that consent was communicated. The 
justification for this is supplied by the same intuitions that justified 
finding Prof. Smith guilty. First, a mistaken belief that a complainant 
wanted to engage in sexual activity is likely to be recalcitrant to the 
extent that it will colour the accused's interpretation of communication. 
If an accused honestly believed that a complainant wanted to engage in 
sexual activity, then he is likely to have interpreted indications of "no" 
as indications of "yes". His beliefs are likely to cohere into a myth about 
the meaning of the particular communication that took place. A belief in 
a myth that actively suppresses the correct interpretation of 
communication must not form the basis for exculpating an accused. To 
29 An excellent discussion of the problems here is found in N. Brett, "Sexual Offenses and 
Consent" (1998), 11 Can. J.L. & Juris. 69. I would also like to thank Prof. Brett for his 
commentary on the ideas in this paper. 
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do so would simply foster the holding of myths about women and when 
they consent to sex. Second, a mistaken belief that a complainant wanted 
to engage in sexual activity denies a premise of the criminal law: it is the 
complainant's attitude which is determinative of her desires, including 
the desire not to be interfered with. This is a basic tenet of autonomy, 
and autonomy must be a central concern of sexual assault law if 
women's interests are to be adequately protected. Allowing an 
accused's belief about the complainant's desires to determine (even if 
only indirectly) whether he has broken the law would distort the 
autonomy interests involved. Third, an accused's incorrect belief that a 
complainant desired sexual activity is likely to place women directly at 
risk of the very harm contemplated by sexual assault law. To allow these 
types of mistaken beliefs to fonn paii of an exculpatory mechanism 
would significantly erode the protection the law is supposed to provide. 
A new doctrine of willful blindness based on a model of active 
suppression would affect a true separation of the two types of consent 
contemplated in the Ewanchuk decision. Given that this separation 
played a significant role in the decision, adoption of the new model 
seems justified. 
PARTIV 
The employment of this novel doctrine of willful blindness, based on 
active suppression, would result in a number of procedural changes in 
the way sexual assaults are tried. In order to establish this type of willful 
blindness, the Crown would have to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the accused intentionally touched the complainant in a sexual 
manner, the complainant did not want the touching to occur, and the 
complainant did not communicate permission to be touched. Proof of 
these elements could result in a finding of willful blindness if the trier of 
fact is satisfied that the accused's mistaken belief in consent was both 
unreasonable and caused by an active suppression of a correct 
interpretation of the complainant's non-communication of consent. 
An accused could defend against a finding of willful blindness by 
establishing evidence tending to show that his unreasonable belief in 
communication of consent was not due to active suppression of the 
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correct interpretation. He could do this by showing that his mistaken 
belief was based on something other than his belief about the 
complainant's desires (or the desires of women in general). His 
mistaken belief would not have to be reasonable, just founded on 
something other than myth. Consider the following example. 
Imagine that Adam and Beth are intimate sexual partners. They 
have been seeing each other for a while and are looking to "spice up" 
their sexual relationship. Each is interested in acting out a particular 
sexual fantasy. They agree that Adam will come to Beth's apartment on 
a given night at precisely 9:00 p.m. He will pretend to break into the 
apartment and force himself on Beth, who will pretend to resist his 
advances. Beth gives Adam the key to her apartment for this purpose. 
Imagine that two separate incidents occur, causing these plans to go 
horribly awry. First, on the night in question Beth is held up by an 
emergency at work and is unable to return to her apartment by 9:00 p.m. 
or to inform Adam of this fact. Second, Beth's identical twin sister, 
Carla, has arrived in town for a surprise visit with Beth. Carla has let 
herself into Beth's apartment with a spare key. She waits there in 
anticipation of Beth's return from work. Adam has never met Carla and 
does not even know that Beth has a sister. At 9:00 p.m., Adam arrives at 
Beth's apartment and the inevitable ensues. 
If Adam is charged with sexually assaulting Carla, the Crown will 
likely be able to prove that intentional sexual activity took place, that 
Carla did not desire the touching, and that her protests communicated 
her non-consent. If we assume that Adam's actions were unreasonable 
(a reasonable person would not have accepted the risk inherent in this 
sort of plan or, alternatively, would have asked for further explicit 
agreement just prior to the activity), then Adam's mistaken belief in 
communication of consent is either a result of willful blindness or 
exculpatory as negating mens rea. 
In this situation, it appears that Adam's mistake was an isolated 
mistake about the identity of the woman in Beth's apartment. His 
mistaken belief was not of such a nature that it suppressed true 
knowledge; had Adam realized, through perception, that it was not Beth 
in the apartment, he would not have proceeded with his actions. Adam 
proceeded in ignorance of Carla's identity, but not through an active 
suppression of the truth. 
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Contrast the above hypothetical situation with the actual incident 
involving Sansregret described at the beginning of this paper. Sansregret 
intentionally caused the fear that induced his former girlfriend's 
pretence of consent. Therefore, he must have been aware of her fear. For 
Sansregret to be ignorant of this fact, he must have been relying on a 
belief that his ex-girlfriend actually desired the sexual interaction. When 
it was found, as a matter of fact, that she did not desire the activity, there 
was no basis for thinking that Sansregret's mistake had been based on 
anything except an active suppression of the truth. Having no foundation 
for his unreasonable belief in genuine consent, Sanregret's conviction 
on the basis of willful blindness seems appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
It bears pointing out that a new conception of willful blindness 
based on active suppression of truth helps to rectify the standoff between 
feminists and liberals. A new notion of willful blindness accomplishes 
two objectives which con-espond with feminist ideals. First, it may help 
to convict men who subject women to violence. Second, it takes the 
crime of rape out of the minds of men (subjective mistaken belief in 
consent) and places an appropriate focus on actual female 
communications and the meaning of consent. In effect, this would deny 
accused men the ability to rely on recalcitrant myths about women, 
female consent, and sexual assault. This legal denial may eventually 
erode such myths in society and actually make women more safe and 
secure in their bodies. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of female interests would not come at 
the expense of imprisoning men solely as an implementation of public 
policy. Men convicted under an active suppression model of willful 
blindness would be the agents of their own punishment. This is due to 
the level of activity involved in the way they disregard communications 
of non-consent. A man who receives an indication that a woman does 
not give permission to be touched sexually, disregards the 
communication on the basis that it is inconsistent with his interpretation 
of the situation, and then proceeds with sexual activity, cannot claim 
innocence. He has acted, both mentally and physically, and he has acted 
culpably in each sense. Guilt attaches to both his act and his mind, each 
of which conspired to cause harm. 
